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FEDERAL REGULATION OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
RECENT demands for increased federal restriction of commodity speculation
have focused widespread attention on organized commodity exchange trad-
ing.1 Prompted chiefly by price increases following the outbreak of the Kor-
ean War,2 this latest burst of criticism adheres to a historically familiar stereo-
type-the belief that speculation leads to agricultural price depressions and
inflations.3
1. President Truman has been one of the most persistent exponents of tighter federal
regulation of commodity speculation. In his April 26, 1951, message to Congress requesting
extension of the Defense Production Act of 1950, the President recommended that a provi-
sion be added authorizing federal "control of margins for speculation on- commodity
futures markets." N.Y. Times, April 27, 1951, p. 10, col. 5. For a discussion of futures
margin regulation, see pages 844-47 infra.
The bill which became the Defense Production Act of 1950 originally contained a
similar provision. H.R. 9176, § 411, 96 Cong. Rec. 12408 (Aug. 10, 1950). This section
was, however, deleted by both houses before final passage of the Act. A substitute provi-
sion, § 606, requiring exchanges to limit "excessive" speculation upon advice from the
Secretary of Agriculture met a similar fate.
Numerous earlier bills providing for federal authority to set futures trading margins
also failed to pass. The most recent of these are H.R. 4685, introduced in the 81st Cong.,
1st sess., on May 16, 1949, by Rep. Cooley, and H.R. 2624, introduced by Rep. Walsh on
Feb. 10, 1949.
The President has reiterated his requests for federal power to restrict futures specula-
tion in most of his recent economic reports. See, e.g., Jan. 12, 1951, Economic Message
to Congress, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1951, p. 5, col. 4; 1950 Mid-year Economic Report to
Congress, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1950, p. 18, col. 5. See also July 19, 1950 message to Con-
gress on the Korean situation, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1950, p. 14, col. 8, and radio address
of the same day, id. at p. 15, col. 5.
A similar recommendation was made by Secretary of Agriculture Brannan in an
address at Michigan State College on Aug. 22, 1950. N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1950, p. 43,
col. 7. See note 2 infra. See also REP. COMMODITY EXCHANGE AUTHORITY [hereinafter
designated as CEAI 7-11 (1950).
2. In his radio address of July 19, 1950, President Truman said: "[W]e must adopt
measures to prevent inflation and to keep our Government in a sound financial condition.
One of the major causes of inflation is the excessive use of credit. I have [therefore]
recommended that the Congress authorize the Government to .. . curb speculation in
agricultural commodities." N.Y. Times, July 20, 1950, p. 15, col. 5. And on Dec. 24, 1950,
Senator Humphrey called on the newly elected 82d Congress to give the President "full
authority to crack down on" commodity speculation, which, the Senator contended, was
adding billions of dollars to the cost of the defense program. N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1950,
p. 17, col. 6.
3. BAER & SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 55 (1949). The
recurring strength of this sentiment is demonstrated by the fact that most of the early
congressional bills dealing with commodity futures trading were introduced during periods
of agricultural depression. See HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY
MARs IN THE UNITE STATES 365-7 (1932).
In addition, futures speculation has long been attacked as a form of gambling. Id. at
353-4. For a strong exposition of this position, see E. D. MACDOUGALL, SPECULATION AND
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This belief has some validity, though not as much as the victims of such
economic disequilibria have claimed.4 Federal regulation, with its gradually
tightening curbs on speculation, has considerably reduced these disturbances.
And certain modifications of the basic regulatory statute, the Commodity
Exchange Act,5 would operate to decrease still further the magnitude and
frequency of price movements induced solely by speculative market activity.
Improved means of attaining this objective must, however, be designed so
as not to hamper the useful functions which commodity exchange trading
serves in the marketing of agricultural and other commodities.
FUNCTIONS OF SPECuLATION ON COIMIMODITY EXCHANGES
Transactions on organized commodity exchanges involve primarily 0 the
purchase and sale of "futures" 7-contracts for the delivery of a specified
GA BL NG c. 6 (1936). This attitude is reflected to a great extent in state law dealing
with futures contracts. See note 40 infra. The defense of futures speculation against the
charge of gambling is based primarily on the social and economic utility of the former.
BAER & SAXON, op. cit. siepra, at 58-63.
4. For an anaylsis of price distortions brought about by speculation, see 7 FTC,
REP. ON THE GRAIN TRADE c. 7 (1926). The influence of large-scale speculators on
price movements in the early years of federal regulation is extensively analyzed in
HOFFMAN, GRAIN PRICES AND THE FUTURES MAR= : A 15-YERu StRVE, 1923-1938
41-60 (Dep't Agric. Tech. Bull. No. 747, 1941) [hereinafter cited as HOFFMAN, SURWVY
(1941)]. See also CEA, TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF FUrURES TRADING UNDER FEDERAL
REGULATION 5, 9-10 (1950) ; Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading on
Organized Exchanges, 27 AM. EcoN. REv. 267-78 (1937).
5. 42 STAT. 998 (1922), as amended, 49 STAT. 1491 (1936), 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
6. Most exchanges provide facilities only for futures trading, although on some, par-
ticularly the grain exchanges, dealings in both cash and futures contracts are conducted.
BAER & SAXON, COMxODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 29 (1949).
7. Futures contracts typically contain the following features:
(1) A standard unit of trading. The unit for wheat, corn, and other grain futures
contracts is 5,000 bushels. In addition to this standard "round lot," the leading grain
exchanges also provide a "job lot" of 1,000 bushels for the convenience of smaller traders.
The unit for cotton is "50,000 pounds in about 100 square bales." HOFFMAN, FUTURE
TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 101 (1932).
For the contract units of other commodities subject to federal regulation, see REp. CEA
9 (1950).
(2) Several deliverable grades. The seller may, at his option, deliver on his contract
any one of several deliverable grades of a given commodity.
(3) Price based on "basis" grade. Price quotations on the exchanges are for a so-
called "basis grade." If the seller chooses to deliver a grade other than the basis grade,
the quoted price will be adjusted by a premium or discount depending on whether the
grade tendered is better or poorer than the basis grade.
(4) Delivery during a specified month. Delivery may be made, at the seller's option,
on any day of the delivery month. The delivery period may be extended by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture for not more than ten days after cessation of trading in the particular
future. See note 91 infra. Delivery months for grain futures are May, July, September,
and December; see 5 FTC, REP. ON THE GRAIN TRADE 62 (1920).
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quantity of a certain commodity 8 in a given future month. Most of these
futures commitments are offset, by the sale of futures equalling the number
previously purchased or vice versa, before the arrival of the delivery month. 9
(5) Delivery by transfer of warehouse receipt. Delivery on futures contracts is
effected by delivery to the buyer of the warehouse receipts for the commodity. The com-
modity must be stored in an approved warehouse.
For further discussion of the characteristics of futures contracts, see BAE & SAXON,
COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTUREs TRADING c. 7 (1949) ; HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING
UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES c. 6 (1932).
The fact of forward delivery does not itself distinguish futures contracts from contracts
on the physical market, generally known as the cash or spot market, which may take the
form of "to arrive" contracts providing for deferred delivery. Futures tading differs
from dealings in the physical market in that the latter contemplate delivery of a specific
lot and grade of some commodity, usually on a definite date. HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRAD-
ING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 104-110 (1932).
The historical development of American futures trading in the major commodities is
extensively described in HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra, cc. 2 and 3.
8. The commodities in which futures trading is conducted are listed in note 66 infra.
In the fiscal year 1950, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and corn futures transactions accounted
for approximately 90% of the dollar value of all trading in commodities subject to
federal regulation. See note 66 infra. The following table, condensed from REP. CEA
22 (1950), indicates the relative importance of futures trading in these commodities:
ESTIMATED VALUE OF FUTURES TRADING
Fiscal Years
Commodity 1948 1949 1950
1,000 dollars 1,000 dollars 1,000 dollars
Soybeans .......................... 147,796 3,997,924 9,251,599
Wheat ............................ 14,979,719 10,117,875 9,038,425
Cotton ............................ 19,280,146 10,239,847 8,276,064
Corn .............................. 9,166,415 5,723,401 2,736,211
All others ......................... 5,878,077 3,366,465 3,049,146
Total ..................... 49,452,153 33,445,512 32,351,445
"Not every agricultural commodity is suitable for futures trading. There are six
special qualifications which determine the fitness of a commodity to be the basis for
futures trading. A commodity must be homogeneous, more or less similar throughout;
it must be susceptible of grading; it must be sufficiently durable to last throughout the
life of a future (ordinarily about 1 year) ; trading must be in sufficiently large volume
to support the cost of facilities required; the market must not be controlled by a few
large operators; and the market must be sufficiently wide to be utilized by more than,
regional interests." REP. COMMODITY EXcHANGE ADMINISTRATION [hereinafter cited REP.
CE ADMIN.] 4 (1937). For a more detailed exposition of these reqiurements, see BAR &
SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING c. 6 (1949).
9. Irwin, Legal Status of Trading it Futures, 32 IL. L. REv. 155, 156-7 (1937).
"It is evident that if a man has made both a contract to buy and a contract to sell,
in equal amounts, in the same future, and through the same commission house, it would
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In the case of grain futures, which account for the bulk of exchange transac-
tions,' 0 delivery is actually made on less than 1% of the transactions ef-
fected." Thus trading in futures does not serve primarily to transfer posses-
sion of the contract subject matter; rather it involves mainly the assumption
of the risk of price change by speculation,' 2 or the shifting of such risk by
hedging.' 3
Hedge Facilitation
Hedging is a device by which commodity dealers and processors protect
themselves against adverse price movements in the so-called physical or
"cash" market. These movements may be either price declines on cash com-
modities which they have purchased or contracted to purchase, or price in-
creases on commodities whose sale, generally in processed form, has been
contracted for before the raw commodity is actually acquired.' 4 Hedging is
be possible to wait until the grain should be delivered to him on the contract to buy
and then apply it on the contract to sell, but there would be no object in such a pro-
cedure. Consequently, the man is considered as being 'out of the market' when he
makes an offsetting contract." Id. at 157 n.8.
10. See note 8 supra.
11. SHEPHERD, MARKETING FARM PRODucTs 117 (1946); HOFFMAN, SuRvav 24
(1941).
12. "Speculators as a group can be classified in a number of ways. Classified by
function they may be (1) open speculators or (2) spreaders, the latter type being those
who follow the practice of setting up equal and opposite futures positions between two
futures in the same or different markets with the object of profiting from relative price
changes. Open speculators, in contrast, assume either a long or short position in futures,
but not both, for a possible profit. Open speculators in turn may be professionals, such
as floor traders or scalpers attempting to profit from small intraday price changes
or traders carrying open positions for periods of time longer than one day, or they may
be nonprofessionals-those whose principal occupation lies elsewhere but who trade in
futures from time to time." HOFFMAN, SuRvEY 31-32 (1941).
For an interesting, though brief, discussion of spreading (also known as arbitraging)
in grain futures, see Harris, Arbitraging in Grain, 155 ANNALS 74 (1931). In the cotton
trade the term "straddling" is used as the equivalent of spreading in grain.
The various types of speculators-as distinguished from hedgers-are succinctly de-
scribed in HOFFMAN, FuTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKElS IN THE
UNITED STATES 135-42 (1932).
13. RP. CE ADMIN. 4 (1937) ; HOFFMAN, SuavEY 31 (1941).
On hedging generally, see BAR & SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTmS
TRADING cc. 11 and 12 (1949); 7 FTC, REP. ON THE GRAIN TRADE c. 2 (1926); HOr-
MAN, HEDGING BY DEALING IN GRAIN FuruREs (1925) passim.
14. Providing facilities for hedging is the principal function of the commodity ex-
change. BAER & SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FuruREs TRADING 197 (1949).
In the grain trade, hedging is carried on chiefly by elevator owners, millers, and ex-
porters. Elevators located at terminal markets hedge with a high degree of consistency,
particularly in the spring wheat territory of the Northwest. Except in this area, how-
ever, country elevators do not generally engage in hedging. 7 FTC, REP. ON THE GRAIN
TRADE 3 (1926); Hoffman, The Hedging of Grain, 155 ANNALS 7, 9-10 (1931). Very
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effected by executing a transaction in futures of equal magnitude but in the
opposite position from that held in the cash market.15 Thus, for example, a
grain elevator operator buying 5,000 bushels of wheat in July for storage
would at the same time undertake, by the short sale 16 of a December futures
contract, to deliver 5,000 bushels of wheat in December. When the stored
grain is sold, say in November, the operator would buy a December wheat
futures contract for 5,000 bushels. He thereby eliminates his position in the
futures market, since his December obligations both to buy and sell 5,000
bushels exactly offset each other. As price movements of futures generally
parallel those of the cash commodity,17 any loss incurred in the cash market
little hedging is done by farmers. Id. at 9. See also SHEPHERD, MARKE-ING FARM
PRODUCrS 112-114 (1946).
Broadly speaking, producers, elevator owners and dealers own stocks of actual com-
modities before undertaking their sale. These interests thus hedge to protect themselves
against price declines in the commodity from the time of acquisition to that of sale. On
the other hand, processors and manufacturers, such as millers, often contract for the sale
of the commodity or its product before actually obtaining stocks of the commodity. Con-
sequently they employ hedging as insurance against a rise in the price of goods which
must be obtained to meet their obligations. BAR & SAxoN, COMMoDr EXCHrANGES
AND FUTUREs TRADING 205 (1949) ; 7 FTC, op. cit. supra at 34; Hoffman, op. cit. mtpra
at 9-10.
The failure of some dealers and processors to hedge all or part of their cash com-
mitments may be explained partly by a desire to speculate and partly by the fact that
some commodity commitments are not suitable for hedging. The latter is frequently
true, for example, of products of commodities whose market values are only loosely
related to the price of the original commodity. See note 17 infra. Effective hedging
may also be precluded if the commodity is located far outside the main channels of
shipment, or if too small a quantity of the commodity is involved. HOFFMAN, SURvEY 42
n.21 (1941).
15. The process of hedging in futures in exactly the same quantity and at the same
time as the cash transaction is known as "strict-rule hedging." In practice, however,
hedgers occasionally deviate from the "strict rule," both as to quantity and timing. 7
FTC, REP. ON THE GRAIN TRADE 53-7 (1926).
16. A "short" sale on the futures market is the sale of a futures contract which is
not offset by a prior futures purchasing commitment.
17. BAER & SAXON, CoMMoDrrY EXCHANGES AND FUTURE TRADING 206 (1949).
The reasons for this relationship, together with an analysis thereof in four commodities
for a ten-year period, are set out in HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED
CoMoDIn LARKTS IN THE UN TED STATEs 254-60 (1932). See also HOFFMAN,
SURVEY 28-30 (1941).
Despite the over-all tendency of futures and cash prices to move together, a number
of factors may interfere with this relationship and thus preclude perfect protection through
hedging. Such disturbances may occur both in the spread between the market price of
the cash commodity and the various futures, see Stevens, Relationship of Cash and
Futures Prices, 155 ANNALS 79 (1931), and in the relationship between the price of the
basis grade and the various other grades dealt with in the physical market. BAER &
WOODrF, COMMODITY EXCHANGES 89 (1935).
An additional complication is introduced in the case of processor hedging. Here
successful hedging requires that price movements of the manufactured product parallel
those of the raw commodity. Whether this relationship exists depends to a large extent
[Vol. 60: 822
1951] REGULATION OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 827
would be compensated for by a corresponding gain on the futures transac-
tion.' s
Hedging is advantageous to producer, consumer, and middleman. The
middleman can operate on less capital than would be required in the absence
of hedging, because of the insurance against adverse price changes and the
resulting improved credit position which hedging provides. 19 Consumers and
producers benefit from the fact that cutting the risk of loss due to adverse
price changes reduces the middleman's operating costs, and thus tends to
decrease the gap between the amounts paid by the consumer and received by
the producer for the commodity.
20
However, extensive hedging activities on exchanges are made possible
only by the presence of speculators-persons whose futures transactions are
not designed to protect a cash market position 2 1-willing to assume the risks
which hedgers seek to shed. "Short" hedgers, such as grain elevator opera-
tors who initially sell futures to protect their cash commodities against price
declines, account for a far larger number of futures contracts than "long" or
buying hedgers, such as processors who sell their products before purchasing
the raw commodity.2 2 Speculators are therefore needed in order to equalize
the number of futures sold and bought. Furthermore, there must be sufficient
on the proportion which the raw material cost bears to that of the finished product BAR
& WOODRUF, op. cit. supra, at 91. For graphs showing the correlation of flour prices
and wheat costs, see Moore, Hedging by a Wheat Flour Miller in PROCEED.INGS, 3D
ANNUAL GRAIN MARKETING Symposim 63-4 (Chicago Board of Trade, 1950).
In addition to the vicissitudes in the future-cash price relationship a further fact
which prevents the hedger from breaking exactly even is the brokerage commission
which he must pay on his futures hedging transactions. In grain futures this amounts
to 3/ cent per bushel for the "round turn," i.e., the sale and purchase together. SurmHER,
MARKETING F mu PRoDuc'rs 107 (1946).
18. Of course, successful hedging also "insures" against possible profits from cash
market price changes. But the hedger is willing to forgo this gain for the protection
which hedging provides in case of adverse price changes. He is interested in profits
derived from handling or processing the actual commodity, not in speculative profits.
See BAER & SAXON, CommoDrY EXCHANGES AND FUTUiS TRADING 204 (1949).
19. Banks lending to commodity interests strongly encourage hedging and extend
credit to a higher percentage of the value of goods pledged as security if they have
been hedged. BAR & SAxoN, Cosmonrry EXCHANGES AND FUTR S TRADING 212 (1949).
20. BAER & SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 34-7, 213 (1949) ;
Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on S. 1881, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 29, 143-8, 151 (1948).
It has been suggested that hedging results in lower trade margins primarily because
it permits the entrance into the commodity trade of smaller dealers with comparatively
little capital, thus resulting in broader and more effective competition. 7 FTC, REP. ON
T'E GRAIN TRADE 37, 239-41 (1926).
21. See note 12 supra.
22. REP. CEA 26-7 (1950); HoFFMAN, SuRvEY 36-9 (1941).
But cf. the unusual situation in May, 1946, when speculators in wheat and corn were
net short while hedgers held a net long position. CEA, Er-scT ON FUTURES TRADING IN
GRAINS OF CHANGES IN PRICE CEMI.INGS OF MAY 13, 1946 (1946).
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futures market liquidity, in the sense of a large enough volume of trading, to
accommodate a hedging transaction whenever the need for one arises. This




Futures speculation also has a role 24 in stabilizing commodity prices. 25
Both comparative analysis of particular commodities 26 and German 27 and
American 28 experience under temporary suspension of futures trading in-
23. See BAER & SAXON, CommoDIrY EXCHANGES AND FUTURiS TRADING 32, 34, 73-5
(1949). For a discussion of the volume of speculation necessary adequately to support
hedging, see pages 847-48 infra.
24. The two functions of commodity futures trading discussed here-hedge facilitation
and price stabilization-are those most relevant to the problem of governmental regulation
of exchange transactions. Other functions include providing a continuous year-round
market for the commodities in which trading is conducted, and aiding efficient price deter-
mination by providing systematic daily price quotations. REP. CE ADMIN. 4 (1937).
25. See, generally, FREDERicx, AGRICULTURAL M f E~r.s 59-60 (1937); 7 FTC, REP.
ON THE GRaIN TRADE 16-18 (1926); BRAcE, THE VALUE OF ORGANIZED SPECULATION
54-9 (1913). In Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Clyne, 260 U.S. 704 (1922),
involving the constitutionality of the Grain Futures Act, twenty-two prominent economists
filed affidavits in which each "declared his belief that, with infrequent and minor exceptions,
futures trading had a marked tendency to stabilize prices." BaR & SAXON, COMMODITY
EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 69 n.10 (1949).
26. Probably the most reliable of these studies compared the Chicago Board of Trade
prices of wheat, oats, and barley, the last of which was not the subject of futures trading,
for the period 1899-1916. Whereas wheat prices showed a fluctuation of over 100% in only
one of these years, and oats in two, barley prices fluctuated by at least this amount in
eight of the 18 years analyzed. BoYLE, SPECULATION AND THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE
122-3 (1920). A similar comparison, though of more doubtful validity, was made by the
Minneapoljs Chamber of Commerce between price fluctuations of wheat and those of
onions, potatoes, and apples over a 29-year period. No futures trading was then conducted
in the latter three commodities. This study revealed an average annual fluctuation in
wheat prices of only 5.36%; on the other hand, onions fluctuated more than 10.9%, apples
almost 100%, and potatoes 687. Futures transactions are now conducted in all these
commodities. See note 66 infra. BAER & SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES
TRADING 71 (1949).
27. The German Exchange Act of 1896 prohibited all exchange dealings for future
delivery in grain and flour. Emery, Ten Years Regulation of the Stock Exchange in
Germany, 17 YALE REv. 5, 8 (1908). As a result of this measure, directed against short
selling, bull movements and reactions were accentuated. BAER & WOODRUFF, COMMODITY
EXCHANGES 185 (1935). For further discussion of the bizarre effects of the German
Exchange Act on futures trading practice, see Emery, The Results of the German Ex-
change Act of 1896, 13 PoL. SCL Q. 286, 291-301 (1908). See also BOYLE, SPECULATION
AND THM CHICAGO BOARD oF TRADE 182-96 (1920).
28. Futures trading in wheat was suspended because of the World War I emergency
in August 1917. MEm., THE FUrURE OF THE FUTURES MAR=ETS 12 (1941). As a result,
"[f]luctuations in cash wheat [prices] became violent and there were many days when
spot wheat declined or advanced 25 to 30 cents a bushel." Uhlman Grain Co. Letter to the
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dicate that a greater element of price stability may be expected when specu-
lative trading exists than in its absence.
The traditional theoretical explanation of this phenomenon is that specula-
tors actively acquaint themselves with the factors likely to affect prices, and,
by acting on this information, bring about gradual price changes reflecting
future cash commodity conditions.2 9 The reduction of unusual and unneces-
sary price fluctuations thus depends on the speculators! capacity to divine
future price influences.30
Actually, however, most speculators are not experts. A large percentage
are engaged in occupations totally unrelated to the marketing of commodi-
ties."' Moreover, most speculators carry relatively small accounts 32 and the
vast majority do not engage in speculation as a full-time business.33 These
facts cast doubt on most traders' familiarity with underlying price factors.
And a study of grain futures trading for the period 1923-38 indicates that
the large speculator possesses only slightly greater omniscience than the
average speculator. Although the combined trading of a group of large spe-
culators was found to parallel price changes, the activities of the individual
large traders deviated considerably from the general price pattern.
34
The price stabilizing influence of speculation is actually best viewed in terms
of the pattern of trading habits characteristic of large and small speculators
Trade quoted in N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1950, p. 29, col. 2. See also BoYLEz, SPECULATIOx
AND THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE 124 (1920).
29. FREDERIcK, AGRiCULTURAL MARxEms 59-60 (1937). BAR & WOODRUFF, CoM-
MODrrY EXCHANGES 22-3 (1935); Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading
on Organized Exchanges, 27 Am. EcoN. Rv. 267 (1937).
30. Hoffman, Past and Present Theory Regarding Futures Trading, 19 J. FAM
Ecox. 300, 308 (1937).
31. Analysis by the Department of Agriculture of Chicago Board of Trade wheat
and corn futures commitments open on September 29, 1934, revealed that speculators were
engaged in approximately 600 occupations and subdivisions ranging alphabetically from
abstractors to yeast makers. Clerks, merchants (including automobile dealers, druggists,
grocers, etc.) and related professional groups held 52% of the total number of speculative
accounts. Executives, financiers, and professionals accounted for an additional 26% of
the total. Although farmers held more speculative accounts than any other single voca-
tional group, their holdings constituted less than 13% of the total number of accounts
and a far smaller percentage of the total number of speculative futures contracts. House-
wives also loomed large as speculators, holding almost 7% of the open speculative accounts.
BAGNELL, ANALYSIS OF OPEN COMMITMfENTS IN WHEAT AND CoRN FUTURES ON THE
CIaICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, SEPTEMBER 19, 1934 reported in Hoffman, op. cit. supra note
30, at 302-304 and HOFFMAN, SURvEY 30-1 (1941).
32. The survey cited in note 31 supra found that 92% of the long speculation accounts
involved less than 25,000 bushels each, and that the average size of these accounts was
only 10,000 bushels. By way of contrast, hedging accounts averaged 420,000 bushels.
33. HOFFMAN, SURVEY 32 (1941).
34. Id. at 47-8, 52 (1941). The relationship found between prices and the trading
of market leaders, id. at 43-60, thus appears to be due to the effect of these trades on
prices rather than prediction of price changes by the individual large traders. Id. at 48-49.
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as separate groups.35 Analysis has shown that most large speculators are
traders in price movements; that is, they follow rather than anticipate price
changes, buying when prices are rising and selling when they decline.36 Small
speculators, on the other hand, have been found, as a group, to trade against
price movements.3 T Thus small speculators exert a stabilizing influence, while
the activities of large speculators tend to accentuate fluctuations. Taking the
market as a whole, price stability thus depends largely on the excess of trad-
ing volume of the former over that of the latter.
3s
BACKGROUND OF PRESENT FEDERAL REGULATION
Need for Regulation
Exchange trading can effectively serve its hedge facilitating and price sta-
bilizing functions only in a futures market which accurately reflects under-
lying supply and demand conditions. But experience indicates that a com-
pletely unpoliced futures trading system does not fully meet this requirement.
First, such a system permits large-scale speculation by individual traders
which may result in marked price changes not warranted by valid market
considerations. Second, prices may be deliberately distorted by manipulation.
Third, information on the volume of trading and other relevant factors neces-
sary for orderly market operations is not readily available. Finally, the need
for policing is increased by the fact that unwary speculators are easy prey
to unscrupulous "bucket-shop" operations 39 and other questionable dealer
35. Of course no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between large and small
traders. Several Department of Agriculture studies analyze the transactions of the few
traders holding at least 2,000,000 bushels of grain. See, e.g., id. at 46, 50 (1951). How-
ever, the standard used to classify large-scale speculators in the 1920s was 500,000 bushels
or more. Id. at 57.
Federal regulation now limits speculation in wheat, corn, and several other grain
futures to maximum net positions or daily trades of 2,000,000 bushels. See note 87 infra.
36. Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading on Organized Exchanges,
27 Am. EcoN. REv. 267, 270-1 (1937) ; 2 FTC, REP. or MErODS AND OPmriONs OF
GRAIN EXPORTERS 49-50 (1923). The effects of "movement traders" as distinguished
from speculators concerned primarily with supply and demand conditions are analyzed
in Irwin, op. cit. supra, at 271-8. The author points out that true speculation, comprising
only a small part of futures dealings, promptly brings prices to levels justified by economic
conditions and stabilizes prices. Movement trading, on the other hand, aggravates
fluctuations and provides no assurance that underlying economic factors will be reflected
in commodity price levels. Ibid. See also HOFFMAN, SUR=v 50-3 (1941).
37. HoFFmAN, SutvEy 51-2 (1941); Hoffman, Past and Present Theory Regarding
Fuctures Trading, 19 J. FAMxt EcoN. 300, 307 (1937).
38. HoFF Ax, SuRvEY 49 (1941).
39. The ways of the bucket shop are many and devious, but all bucketing is character-
ized by the fact that the shop assumes a position opposite that of its customer. Under
old-fashioned practice, the shop simply failed to execute the customer's order on the
exchange, thus automatically assuming the other side of the "contract" itself. Where
buying and selling customers offset each other, the shop collected commissions without
[Vol. 60: 822
1951] REGULATION OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 831
practices. These inadequacies of the completely free market make some sort
of governmental control of futures trading imperative.
State Law
State law in this field, though voluminous, has not provided the needed
regulation. Both statutes and case law deal primarily with the prevention of
bucketing and wagering arrangements. 40 They generally attempt to achieve
this result by invalidating futures contracts unless, at the time the transaction
was entered into, the parties intended actual delivery of the goods.41 But since
delivery is initially contemplated in but a small minority of contracts,42 this
unrealistic standard renders unenforceable even properly executed exchange
transactions.43  Some states, recognizing the inadequacy of this rule, have
assuming either the risks of the market or the cost of executing the order on the exchange.
However, most customers are on the long side so that bucket shops prospered only in
a generally declining market. If prices, based on organized commodity exchanges quota-
tions, moved against the bucket-shop, its proprietor could use the margin funds deposited
with him to engage in large-scale trades on the exchange in an effort to alter the price
trend in his favor. Hui, GOLD BsucKs oF SPEc LATioN 69 (1904). As a last resort, the
bucket-shop could simply be closed up and reopened elsewhere. HOFFMAN, FuTrUR
TRADING UPON ORGANIZED CoIuODiTn" MxzE' s 357-8 (1932).
Modern bucketing methods, better designed to escape detection, involve executing the
customer's order on the exchange and then immediately closing it out without the cus-
tomer's knowledge. Legis., 45 HARv. L. REv. 912, 916 n.25 (1932). These practices are
now specifically prohibited by the Commodity Exchange Act. See note 72 infra.
40. The statutes pertaining to bucket shops and gamblings contracts are collected in
Legis., 45 HAuv. L. Rv. 912, 917 n.26. For the relevant case law, see sources cited in
note 41 infra.
41. For more detailed exposition and discussion of this common law "intent-to-deliver"
rule, which has been incorporated into most bucketing and wagering statutes, see 6
W usToN, CoNTRcrs § 1670 (Rev. ed. 1938); Irwin, Legal Status of Trading in;
Futures, 32 ILL. L. REv. 155 (1937); Taylor, Trading in Commodity Futures-A New
Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE LJ. 63 (1933) ; Legis., 45 HAav. L. REv. 912 (1932).
42. See note 11 supra.
43. For the purpose of determining validity under the intent-to-deliver test, futures
transactions are viewed as two separate contracts. One of these is the contract between
the two brokers acting as principals on the exchange. As to this transaction, the
intent-to-deliver requirement has been held to be satisfied by the all but universal inten-
tion to make an offsetting contract on the exchange. Board of Trade of City of Chicago
v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905). The courts have, however, not
been as generously inclined toward the second contract-that between broker and
customer. While there would seem to be no practical reason for treating this part of
the transaction differently from that between the brokers, the prevailing view holds
broker-customer contracts invalid in the absence of actual intent to deliver, regardless
of the validity of the corresponding inter-broker trade. 6 WILLISTON, CoNMa!Lcrs § 1672
(Rev. ed. 1938).
The validity of the inter-broker contract is hardly ever litigated. Legis., 45 HIAv.
L. REv. 912, 915 n.18 (1932). However, the illegality of broker-customer contracts
has frequently been used as a defense in suits by brokers for commissions or for
advances made to customers and in customers' suits to recover margin deposits from
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amended their statutes to render valid all futures trades executed on organized
exchanges. 44 In addition, a few states have developed embryonic regulatory
systems.45 But, by and large, regulation of exchange trading, based on a recog-
nition of its legitimate economic function, has been left to Congress.
Early Federal Control
Despite repeated pressure by depression-struck farmers to emasculate the
exchange trading system,40 federal legislation had a cautious beginning. Early
laws, enacted in the 1910s, were very limited in scope. One of these, the
Cotton Futures Act,47 dealt only with the grading of cotton deliverable on
brokers. Note, Dealings in Futures, 40 HARv. L. REv. 638, 639 n.11 (1927). The
intent-to-deliver rule thus serves virtually no purpose except to encourage "welching"
by broker or customer in case of adverse price changes. See Taylor, Trading in Coln-
modity Futures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE Lj. 63, 89-94 (1933).
44. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 68-1002 (1948); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 851.01 (1943); OK.LA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§564-5, 569 (1937); S. C. CODE ANN. §6314 (1942); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 11303 (Williams 1934).
Hedging transactions are exempted from the operation of the otherwise orthodox
statute in Minnesota. MiN. STAT. ANN. § 614.16 (1947). And the statutes of Alabama,
Florida, and North Carolina accord a similar dispensation to futures dealings by manu-
facturers and wholesalers in the regular course of business. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 9,
§ 32 (1940) ; FLA. STAT. Am. § 850.09 (1944) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-3 (1943).
See Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges, 40 YALE L.J. 843 (1931).
45. Illinois and Ohio have statutory provisions making trading in indemnities a
criminal offense unless they meet the common law intent-to-deliver test. Indemnities
are options to enter into futures contracts at an agreed price. See 2 FTC, REP. ON THE
GRAIN TRADE 332-3 (1920). The same sections also prohibit forestalling the market
by spreading false rumors to influence commodity prices, as well as cornering or
attempting to corner the market for any commodity. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 328
(Smith-Hurd 1936); OHio GEN. CODE ANN. § 13069 (Page's 1937). The Kansas
statutes forbid the exclusion of financially responsible producers' cooperative asso-
ciations from exchange membership if they have complied with all lawful exchange
rules. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §2-1604 (1949); cf. M Nx. STAT. ANN. §311.04 (1946).
The only legislation of a supervisory nature consists in the requirement, imposed by
several states, that the books of exchanges shall be open to inspection by authorized
officials. E.g., OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 568 (1938).
46. See note 3 supra. BAm & WOoDRUFF, COaImoDInr EXCHIANGES 183-4 (1935).
More than 200 bills were introduced in Congress between 1884 and 1921 providing for
prohibition, supervision, or regulation of one sort or another of trading in commodity
futures. REP. CE ADmix. 2 (1937). For a brief summary of some of the more recent
restrictive legislative proposals, see Legis., 45 HARv. L Rzv. 912, 924 n.58 (1932).
47. 38 STAT. 693 (1914), reenacted, 39 STAT. 476 (1916). For a brief history of the
events leading up to the passage of this Act, see BAER & WooDRuFF, CommoDrry Ex-
CHANGFS 186-8 (1935).
The Act provides for the imposition of a tax of two cents per pound on futures con-
tracts unless stipulated regulatory conditions are met, and now constitutes c. 14 of the
Internal Revenue Code. INT. REv. CODE §§ 1920-35.
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futures contracts, 48 and with "difference! systems-methods of determining
the price differential between the basis grade 49 and all other deliverable grades.
Two other statutes, the Grain Standards Act 5 o and the Warehouse Act,5 1 also
served merely to raise and standardize conditions of delivery on futures con-
tracts.
The first comprehensive federal effort to regulate exchange trading was the
Grain Futures Act.52 Limited to transactions in grain futures,13 this statute
was designed primarily to serve a two-fold functionP4 One was to bring to
light previously unavailable market information, necessary for orderly trading.
This information was also to provide a basis for further legislation, and to
permit effective enforcement of the other provisions of the Act. The statute
required exchanges and their members to keep records and file reports, 5 and
48. The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to promulgate standards for the
grading of cotton. IxT. REv. CODE § 1926. This provision is supplemented by the Cotton
Standards Act. 42 STAT. 1517 (1923), 7 U.S.C. § 51 (1946).
The Cotton Futures Act also provides for the establishment of a minimum grade of
cotton deliverable on futures contracts. INT. REv. CoDE § 1922(5).
49. The basis or contract grade is the grade of the commodity for which prices are
quoted on the exchange. See note 7 supra.
50. 39 STAT. 482 (1916), 7 U.S.C. §71 (1946).
51. 39 STAT. 486 (1916), 7 U.S.C. §241 (1946).
52. 42 STAT. 998 (1922). This statute was preceded in 1921 by the Futures Trading
Act, 42 STAT. 187 (1921), most of which was promptly declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court as an invalid exercise of the taxing power. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44
(1922). The Grain Futures Act contained substantially the same provisions as the
.Futures Trading Act, but was based on the commerce clause rather than the taxing
power. See Grain Futures Act, § 3. The constitutionality of the new statute's provisions
dealing with regulation of exchanges was sustained in Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262
U.S. 1 (1923).
The Court in the Hill case did not pass on the constitutionality of § 3 of the Futures
Trading Act, imposing a tax of twenty cents per pound on indemnities. See note 45
supra. This provision was declared unconstitutional in Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U.S. 475
(1926). Trading in indemnities was thus not subject to federal restriction from 1926
until 1936 when such transactions were declared unlawful by § 4c(B) of the Commodity
Exchange Act.
53. Grain was defined by § 2(a) to include wheat, corn, oats, barley, rye, flax, and
sorghum.
54. For a brief synopsis of the general objectives of the Grain Futures Act, see REP.
GRAIN FUTUREs ADmINiSTRATIONT 2 (1924).
In addition to the major functions discussed here, the Act also protected farmer
cooperatives against arbitrary exclusion from commodity exchange membership. The
right of these cooperative associations to become exchange members and thus secure the
lower commission rates and other membership benefits was one of the outstanding issues
prior to federal regulation. CEA, TWENTY-Fin YEAns OF FuTuREs TRADiNG UNDER
FEDERAL REGuLATION 4 (1950). Further provisions for the protection of cooperatives
were included in the Commodity Exchange Act, §§ 6a and 6b. See BAR & SAxoN, CoM-
moDITY ExcHANGEs AND Futures TRADING 255-6 (1949).
55. Section 5(b) of the act made adoption of rules to this effect by the governing
board of an exchange a condition precedent for designation of such exchange as a con-
tract market. See page 834 infra. Moreover, under § 4(b) the failure of an exchange
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authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to conduct investigations of exchange
operations. 6
The other major function of the statute was to curb, through enforced self-
regulation by the exchanges, certain practices likely to cause unwarranted price
fluctuations. Trading in futures was made unlawful unless conducted on
exchanges designated by the Secretary of Agriculture as "contract markets." 57
To be so designated, exchanges were required to prevent manipulation of prices
and cornering of commodities, 58 as well as dissemination of false or misleading
market information. 9 Failure to comply with these requirements might result
in suspension or revocation of the contract market designation,60 which, in
effect, would close the exchange. The only direct control over individual
traders was a provision imposing criminal penalties for certain actions.61
With its main emphasis on control over exchanges rather than individual
traders, the Act proved ineffectual. The power to ban futures trading should
an exchange fail to exercise the requisite self-discipline-the statute's only
sanction against exchanges-was too drastic. Such action would inevitably
injure innocent traders. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that this penalty
was never'successfully imposed. 2 Moreover, numerous harmful dealer and
broker practices remained entirely unrestricted.
member to keep written records of all trades executed by him rendered these transactions
unlawful. This might subject him to denial of exchange trading privileges, see note 59




59. Section 5(c). In addition to these requirements for designation as a contract
market and those set out in note 55 supra, an exchange had to comply with three other
conditions to be designated a contract market: (1) It could not become a contract
market unless it was located at a terminal market where cash grain was sold in sufficient
volume to reflect general grain prices and where an approved official inspection service
was available. § 5(a). (2) The exchange was not permitted to exclude financially
responsible, lawfully formed and conducted producers' cooperatives from exchange
membership. § S(e); see note 54 supra. (3) The governing board of the exchange was
required to effectuate orders of the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated under § 6(b)
directing exchanges to refuse exchange trading privileges to violators of the Act. § 5 (f).
60. Section 6(a). Revocation or suspension of an exchange's contract market desig-
nation could be ordered by a commission consisting of the Secretaries of Agriculture and
Commerce and the Attorney General (which under the Commodity Exchange Act became
the Commodity Exchange Commission), subject to review by a circuit court of appeals.
61. Section 9 makes it a misdemeanor to (1) execute a futures contract which is not
properly recorded, or (2) enter into a futures transactions on an exchange not designated
as a contract market, or (3) transmit in interstate commerce false, misleading, or know-
ingly inaccurate crop and market reports.
62. Only once did the commission try to invoke its power. In 1932 it ordered a 60-day
suspension of the contract market designation of the Chicago Board of Trade for re-
fusing to admit a producers' cooperative to membership in its clearing association. On
appeal the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the commission's view that § 5(e)
entitled producers' cooperatives to clearing house privileges in addition to exchange mem-
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Despite these shortcomings, however, the Grain Futures Act remained un-
amended for fourteen years. It was not until 1936, with the passage of the
far more comprehensive Commodity Exchange Act,63 that the inadequacies of
the earlier Act were remedied. 64
bership, and also upheld the constitutionality of § 6(a) authorizing suspension or revoca-
tion of contract markets designations by the commission. But the court set aside the
order and remanded the case to the commission to make further findings on. the coopera-
tive's compliance with the Capper-Volstead Act, 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §291
(1946). Such compliance was held necessary to constitute the cooperative a "lawfully
conducted cooperative'association of producers" under § 5(e) of the Grain Futures Act.
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Wallace, 67 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
291 U.S. 680 (1934). Shortly after this decision the Board of Trade acquiesced in ad-
mitting the cooperative to clearing-house privileges. The suspension order thus never
went into effect. See REP. GRAN FuTURES ADMIISTRATION 5-6 (1934).
63. 49 STAT. 1491 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1946) and 7 U.S.C. § 12-1 (Supp.
1949).
One of the immediate causes of the passage of the Commodity Exchange Act was the
Supreme Court's decision in Wallace v. Cutten, 298 U.S. 229 (1936). The Court there
held that the Secretary of Agriculture could not order the denial of trading privileges to
past manipulators under § 6 (b) since that provision in the Grain Futures Act applied only
to a person who "is manipulating" commodity prices. 42 STAT. 1002 (1922). As a re-
sult of this decision, the only direct sanction provided by the Grain Futures Act against
manipulators became a virtual nullity. The Commodity Exchange Act altered § 6(b) to
include past manipulation, iqhich was also made a misdemeanor under § 9 of the 1936
Act.
64. In the meantime, however, the exchanges themselves enacted rules to improve
trading conditions. Especially important were those establishing limits on daily price
fluctuations. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade, Rule 81; N.Y. Cotton Exchange, Rule 25.
These limits were first adopted as an emergency measure during the banking crisis of 1933,
and are still in effect on a number of commodities. Present daily fluctuation limits on the
principal exchanges for wheat, rye, barley, flaxseed, and soybeans are ten cents per bushel,
for corn, eight cents, and for oats, six cents. CEA, TwxxTY-Frv YtARS OF FuTurES
TRADING ux nR FEaDmA REGULAT oN 4 (1950). Cotton fluctuations limits, not ap-
plicable during the current delivery month, are ten dollars per bale above or below the
previous day's closing price, subject to the further limitation that the price range in one
day is not to exceed ten dollars. Communication to the YALE LAw JoURNAL from J.M.
Mehl, CEA Administrator, dated December 21, 1950, in Yale Law Library.
For a discussion of exchange rules setting minimum margin requirements, another
significant self-regulatory measure, see pages 844-45 infra.
A further means of self-regulation is provided by rules empowering exchanges to
"stop trading . . . in any of the future contracts of any commodity by reason of any
emergency or otherwise." Chicago Board of Trade, Rule 251. See also N.Y. Cotton
Exchange, Rule 28; Commodity Exchange, Inc., §408; Minneapolis Chamber of Com-
merce, Rule 418. A significant recent application of these rules by the grain exchanges
occurred in May and June 1946 when OPA ceiling prices on grain were increased. To
meet the problem of a sudden price increase, the Chicago Board of Trade and tvo other
exchanges adopted a series of regulations under their emergency rule. A suit against the
Chicago Board of Trade alleging that these regulations constituted price fixing in viola-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act was unsuccessful. Cargill v. Board of Trade of City of
Chicago, 164 F. 2d 820 (7th Cir. 1947). For an ex%-tensive discussion of these regula-
tions and the effect of the May 1946 price ceiling changes on futures trading, see CEA,
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THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE AcT
The Commodity Exchange Act constitutes the statutory basis of present
federal futures trading regulation. The scope of this control, later broadened
by two amendments,65 now covers most domestically produced agricultural
commodities in which futures trading is conducted.66 To the main purposes of
the Grain Futures Act, securing market information and eliminating price dis-
tortions, the new legislation added another: protection of traders against fraud-
ulent practices by dealers. In addition, the mechanics for achieving the earlier
objectives were improved considerably. This was accomplished chiefly by
extending federal control directly, through registration requirements and penal
sanctions, to individual futures commission merchants, floor brokers, and cus-
EFFEcT ON FuTruEs TRADING IN GRAINs OF CHANGES IN Paicn CEILINGS OF MAY 13,
1946 passirn (1946).
65. 52 STAT. 205 (1938) and 54 SrAT. 1059 (1940) amending §2(a), 7 U.S.C. §2
(1946). The 1938 amendment added wool tops to the commodities subject to federal
regulation. In 1940 control was extended to fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cotton-
seed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed,
peanuts, soybeans, and soybean meal.
66. REP. CE ADmIN. 4 (1941).
The commodities in which futures are now traded and the major exchanges on
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tomers. 67 Revocation or suspension of registration, coupled with the criminal
penalties provided by the Act against individual violators, constitutes a far
more workable system of sanctions than closing exchanges which permit trad-
ing by offending dealers.
The primary regulatory agency under the Act is now the Commodity Ex-
change Authority, 8 a bureau in the Department of Agriculture. Some
important controls over the exchanges, however, are reserved to the Commodity
Exchange Commission, consisting of the Secretaries of Agriculture and Com-
merce and the Attorney-General. 69
Protection of Customers
To accomplish its purpose of protecting traders from unscrupulous dealers,
the Act contains a broad prohibition against defrauding or deceiving traders.7 0
It also proscribes such specific practices as bucketing 71 and executing counter-
transactions to customers' orders without their permission. 2 These activities
not only constitute frauds on traders but also cause price distortions. In addi-
tion, the statute requires that futures commission merchants segregate and
separately account for margin funds 73 deposited with them by customers
4
This provision, complemented by another prohibiting use of a customer's funds
67. The Act imposes a registration requirement upon futures commission merchants,
§ 4d(1), and floor brokers, § 4e. The definition of futures commission merchant in § 2(a)
covers all brokers and brokerage firms who solicit or accept orders for futures trades. A
floor broker is the person who places the order on the exchange. Ibid.
68. Before the establishment of the Authority in January 1947, the Commodity
Exchange Act had been administered by the Commodity Exchange Administration (July
1936 to February 1942) and by a succession of agencies during World War II. The
Grain Futures Act, prior to the passage of the 1936 legislation, was administered by the
Grain Futures Administration.
69. The Commission has sole authority to (1) set maximum limits on the daily
trades and total net futures commitments of speculative traders. § 4a(1) and (2). These
limits are not applicable to bona fide hedging transactions as defined in the act. § 4a(3).
See note 87 infra. (2) suspend or revoke ari exchange's contract market designation.
§ 6(a). See note 62 supra. (3) hear appeals by an exchange from the refusal of the
Secretary of Agriculture to designate such exchange a contract market. § 6(a). (4) hear
complaints by an exchange seeking to deny membership privileges to producer's co-
operatives on grounds set out in the act. § 6a(1). (5) issue cease and desist orders
against an exchange, or any director, officer, agent or employee thereof for violation of
any provision of the Act or order of the Secretary of Agriculture or the Commodity Ex-
change Commission. Refusal to obey subjects offenders to criminal penalties. § 6b.
70. Sections 4b(A) and (C).
71. See note 39 supra.
72. Section 4b(D). This practice constitutes the modern form of bucketing. It
consists in making a trade on the exchange opposite to that of the customer, thus, in
effect, immediately closing out the customer's position. See note 39 supra.
73. For a discussion of the nature of margins in futures transactions, see page 844
infra.
74. Section 4d(2).
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to finance anyone else's transactions,7 5 protects traders should the broker fail
financially. In effect it makes customers preferred rather than general creditors
as they had been previously.76
Acquisition of Market Information
The statute also facilitates dissemination of trade information essential for
both enforcement and statistical purposes. In addition to the reporting and
record-keeping provisions of the Grain Futures Act,77 exchanges are now
required to furnish the CEA with copies of their by-laws and rules, 78 and must
permit inspection of their books by authorized agents of the Departments of
Agriculture and Justice.79 Futures commission merchants and floor brokers in
order to qualify for registration must furnish such information as the CEA
requires.80 Finally, all traders whose daily transactions or net positions 81
equal or exceed levels set by the Secretary of Agriculture 8 2 are required to
keep detailed records of their trading activities and submit reports.83 These
reports provide statistics on the division of trading between hedging and specu-
lation and the effects of large transactions on price movements.
Control of Manipulation
The fundamental purpose of the Commodity Exchange Act still remains the
elimination of those practices which result in price distortions or unwarranted
75. Ibid.
76. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from J.M. Mehl, CEA Administrator,
dated March 13, 1951, in Yale Law Library.




81. When the trader's long or short position in any one future reaches or exceeds
the levels set out in note 82 infra, he must submit the required information on all his
futures transactions in that commodity. REP. CEA 29 (1950).
8Z The levels in effect on June 30, 1950 were as follows:
Commodity Quantity
Wheat, corn, oats, rye, barley, flaxseed, soybeans,
and grain sorghums 200,000 bushels
Milled rice 56,000 pockets
Cotton 5,000 bales
Wool tops 125,000 pounds
Butter, eggs, and potatoes 25 carlots
Cottonseed oil and soybean oil 900,000 pounds
Lard 600,000 pounds
Millfeeds (bran, shorts, niddlings) 1,000 tons
Cottonseed meal and soybean meal 1,500 tons
REP. CEA 29 (1950).
83. Section 4i.
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fluctuations. Such price influences may be caused more or less unintentionally
by very extensive trading, or they may be the result of planned action, known
as manipulation.
The dissemination of full and accurate market information is one of the
most effective means of preventing successful manipulation. Reports of the
Secretary of Agriculture as to supply, demand, and other market conditions
provide much of the information necessary for orderly trading. 4 And mis-
leading influences are minimized by a specific prohibition in the Commodity
Exchange Act against the circulation of false market rumors.85
However, the most significant provision of the Commodity Exchange Act
pertaining to price influences is aimed at the manipulative power of large
traders. On the basis of a legislative finding that excessive speculation may
cause sudden and unreasonable price fluctuations," the Commodity Exchange
Commission was given power to set maximum limits on the daily volume of
speculative trading and net speculative futures holdings of individual traders. 7
This authority is the Act's most effective means both to restrict the manipula-
tive capacity of sizable speculative holdings and to limit price changes brought
about involuntarily by the activities of large speculators.
The Act also empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to take measures to
lessen the susceptibility of exchange markets to manipulation. This sus-
ceptibility is due partly to the unwillingness of the longs to take delivery or
the inability of shorts to make it.88 The longs' unwillingness, which is to a
84. "[Tihe success or failure of traders in commodity futures is largely dependent
upon their ability to secure, interpret, and evaluate market information concerning
production, distribution, and trading activities. . . ." REP. CE ADMIN. 18-19 (1937).
See also Note, Prevention of Commodity Futures Manipulation under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 54 HAuv. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1941). On price manipulation generally
see 7 FTC, REP. ON T . GRAIN TRADE c. 7 (1926).
85. Section 9 provides criminal penalties for knowingly or carelessly transmitting
in interstate commerce false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning
crop or market information that tend to affect commodity prices. Adoption of exchange
rules to this effect is also a condition precedent to an exchange's designation as a con-
tract market. § 5 (c).
The effect which a false rumor may have on market prices was dramatically
illustrated in 1930 when a spurious publicly-circulated telegram containing false informa-
tion as to a large speculator's financial condition brought about a sharp decline in wheat
futures prices. See REP. GRAIN FUTURES ADmIwsTRATioN 6-7 (1931).
86. Section 4a(1).
87. Sections 4a(1) and 4a(2). Hedging transactions are specifically exempted by
§4a(3). Trading and position limits now in effect for wheat, corn, oats, barley, and
flaxseed were established in 1938. Limits were set for rye at the same time, but these
were reduced in 1945. The 1940 limits on cotton speculation also were lowered, in 1946.
17 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 150.1-150.3 (1949). In February 1951, the Commodity Exchange
Commission held hearings for the purpose of establishing soybean and egg speculative
trading limits. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from J.M. Mehl, CEA
Administrator, dated March 13, 1951, in Yale Law Library.
88. See HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARE:Ers 314-18
(1932).
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great extent inherent in the present futures trading system,s 9 makes it possible
for the manipulating short seller to buy out their contracts at deflated prices.
In this situation the Secretary can aid the long futures holder by requiring up
to ten days' notice of intended delivery.90 As for the shorts, their inability to
make required delivery results from shortages of deliverable commodity sup-
plies likely to occur towards the end of the delivery month. This can be
remedied by the Secretary's giving the shorts a "breathing spell" of up to ten
days after the cessation of trading in the delivery month.9 1 The seller is thus
enabled to acquire supplies located elsewhere than at the delivery point.
9 2
In addition to these indirect measures, the Act makes any attempts to
manipulate prices and comer commodities I' criminal offenses. 4 Moreover,
engaging in manipulative activities is one of the grounds for revoking or sus-
pending the registration of commission merchants and floor brokers.9 5 Effec-
tive enforcement of these sanctions requires a dear, generally accepted con-
ception of what constitutes manipulation.
This issue was squarely posed for the first time under the Commodity Ex-
change Act in General Foods Corp. v. Brannan.96 In that case, four indi-
viduals, a commodity brokerage firm, and the General Foods Corporation had
carried on extensive speculative operations in May 1944 Chicago rye futures.
89. Almost all futures transactions are made for speculative or hedging purposes and
not to obtain commodities. Moreover, speculators rarely have the necessary storage
capacity to accommodate delivered goods. See HOFFMAN, FuTURE TRADING UPON
ORGANIZED COMMODITY MAMES IN THE UNITED STATES 314 (1932). See also a finding
to this effect by the Secretary of Agriculture in the order cited in note 91 infra.
90. Section Sa(5). See note 91 infra.
91. Section 5a(4). Under this section, on February 17, 1938, the Secretary of
Agriculture promulgated an order permitting the settlement of wheat, corn, oats, barley,
rye, and flaxseed futures for seven days after the cessation of trading in such future. 17
CODE FED. REGS. § 100.1 (1949).
The issuance of orders under both §§ 5a (4) and 5a (5) must be preceded by a hearing
and such orders are not applicable to contracts in effect at the time of promulgation.
Thus these provisions are not available for use in case of emergency.
92. See, generally, HOFFMAN, Stvay 60-70 (1941). To further reduce artificial
influences upon commodity prices, the Act also contains provisions prohibiting fictitious
trades, § 4c(A), trading in indemnities, § 4c(B), and any transactions used to cause an
untrue prices to be reported, § 4c(C).
93. The Supreme Court adopted the following definition of a corner in U.S. v.
Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1913) (conspiracy to run a corner in cotton held violation of
Sherman Act § 1) : "'Running a corner' consists, broadly speaking, in acquiring control
of all or the dominant portion of a commodity with the purpose of artificially enhancing
the price, 'one of the important features of which,' to use the language of the Govern-
ment's brief, 'is the purchase for future delivery, coupled with a withholding from sale
for a limited time . . .'" Id. at 539-40. The Court also observed that "not improbably
in actual usage the expression includes modified modes of attaining substantially the same
end." Id. at 540.
94. Section 9.
95. Section 6(b).
96. 170 F.2d 220 (7th'Cir. 1948), 37 GEo. LJ. 450 (1949), 97 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
572 (1949).
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They had also accumulated large speculative stocks of cash rye, which, by the
end of May 1944, amounted to 89%o of the deliverable supply in Chicago.97
On May 13, General Foods, which at that time held over 7,000,000 bushels
of cash rye, bought from three of the individuals involved nearly 2,000,000
additional bushels of "distress" rye which the sellers would otherwise have
been forced to dump on the market. s Thereafter the CEA brought charges
against all these speculators for alleged manipulation of the price and cornering
of both rye futures and cash rye. The Department of Agriculture judicial
officer held that all the respondents had manipulated the price of rye futures
and cash rye by means of the 2,000,000 bushel distress rye transaction. How-
ever, he found that they were not guilty of manipulation and cornering by
virtue of their other operations, but that these other operations did constitute
attempts at manipulating and cornering.99
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the orders of the de-
partmental judicial officer were set aside on the ground that the charges were
not supported by the "weight of evidence." 10 0  In vacating that part of the
97. SHEPHERD, MARKETING FAmu PRODUCrS 126 (1946).
98. 6 Agric. Dec. 288, 304 (1947).
99. Id. at 304-318 (1947).
100. This "weight of evidence" formula, prescribed by the Commodity Exchange Act
to establish the scope of appellate review, §6(b), had not theretofore received any
definitive judicial interpretation. Cf. Nichols & Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture 131
F.2d 651, 654 (1st Cir. 1942) (dictum to the effect that, since Congress used the words
"weight of evidence" rather than merely "evidence" or "substantial evidence," court of
appeals might have authority to consider the evidence de novo).
The Commodity Exchange Act review formula is used in no other federal regulatory
statute. 37 Geo. L.J. 450, 451 (1949). Other acts contain a variety of other formulae.
The Federal Trade Commission Act provides that the Commission's findings of fact shall
be conclusive "if supported by evidence." 52 STAT. 113 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §45(c)
(1946). The Securities Exchange Act requires "substantial evidence," 48 STAT. 881
(1934), 15 U.S.C. §79y(a) (1946), as do the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1065
(1938), 29 U.S.C. §210 (1946), and several other statutes. Still another formula
appears in the Walsh-Healey Act, which uses the words "if supported by the preponderance
of the evidence." 49 STAT. 2038 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 39 (1946).
The Walsh-Healey Act wording, which most closely parallels that of the Commodity
Exchange Act, has not been judicially construed. 37 GEo. I.J. 450, 452 (1949). However,
the "differences in language [in the review provisions of the other acts cited above] seem
to involve no difference in meaning." REP. Arr'y. GEN. Comm. AD PRoc. 89 (1941).
These provisions have been tacitly assumed to mean "supported by substantial evidence."
37 GFo. L.J. 450, 452 (1949).
Nevertheless, the court in the General Foods case held that the standard to be employed
under the Commodity Exchange Act was "something other than the 'substantial evidence
rule.'" 170 F.2d at 223. It interpreted the statutory formula to mean that departmental
orders may be vacated if not supported by the "preponderance or greater weight" of the
evidence. Id. at 224. This deviation from the substantial evidence rule derives no support
from the legislative history of the Act. 37 GFo. L.J. 450, 452 (1949). Although the
application of the substantial evidence rule in the General Foods case would probably not
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judicial officer's order based on his finding that the 2,000,000 bushel distress
rye transaction constituted manipulation, the court offered the first judicial
interpretation of that concept as used in the Commodity Exchange Act. It
found that the distress rye operation involved merely stabilization of a "na-
tural" price at its existing level in order to protect the participants' other
rye and futures investments. The court considered this a valid form of "self-
preservation." The operation was therefore held not to amount to manipula-
tion within the meaning of the Act.
The General Foods opinion distinguished U. S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co.,1' 1 a price-fixing case under the Sherman Act, on the extremely tenuous
ground that the price there sought to be stabilized was an artificial one created
by the acts of the defendants.102  This distinction overlooks the fact that any
operation which interferes with market conditions will result in a manipulated,
i.e., artificial, price, no matter how "natural" the price may have been before
the operation. Since both maintaining an existing price and intentionally
causing price changes result in artificial prices, the definition of manipulation
should be expanded to cover both. This has long been the law in the securities
field, where the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 proscribes certain stock
have changed the result, the preponderance requirement does appear to place on the
Department a heavier burden of proof before an appellate tribunal than must be sustained
by other federal regulatory agencies.
For a recommendation that the Commodity Exchange Act be amended by substituting
the words "substantial evidence" for "weight of the evidence," see SELLERS, ADmiSTRA-
TIvE PROCEDURE AND PAcrTICE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE UNDER THE COM-
moDrrY ExcHANGE ACr 81-83 (Dep't of Agric. 1939).
101. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Since "manipulation" as used in the Commodity Exchange
Act had not theretofore been judicially construed, the Government in the General Foods
case urged upon the court the Supreme Court's interpretation of manipulation in the
anti-trust field. Brief for Respondents, pp. 29-30. In the Socony-Vacuum case the
Supreme Court had said in this connection: "In this case, the result was to place a
floor under the market-a floor which served the function of increasing the stability and
firmness of market prices. This was repeatedly characterized as stabilization. But in
terms of market operations stabilization is but one form of manipulation." 310 U.S. at 223.
102. The court offered as another basis of distinction the fact that the Socony-
Vacuum case involved "a statute [the Sherman Act] which made it illegal per se to
combine for the purpose of "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price
of a commodity." 170 F.2d at 230. But there is no such provision in the Sherman Act,
the relevant portion of which simply declares combinations in restraint of trade to be
illegal. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946). This has been construed by the
Supreme Court to make price fixing illegal per se. And in the Socony-Vacuum case
price fixing is implicitly equated to manipulation, which is there held to include raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing prices. 310 U.S. at 224. The prohibition of
these acts, attributed by the court in the General Foods case to the Sherman Act, is
actually quoted from the interpretation of that statute in the Socony-Vacuum opinion.
Thus, in fact, the Socony-Vacuonz case holds price stabilization to violate a much more
general and ambiguous provision than the Commodity Exchange Act prohibition of
manipulation involved in the General Foods case.
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transactions conducted for the purpose of "pegging, fixing, or stabilizing"
prices.
103
Control of Excessive Speculation
Trading Limits. Price distortions may result not only from manipulation
but also as an unintended incident of the operations of very large speculators.
The power vested in the Commodity Exchange Commission to set individual
daily trading and net commitment limits 10 4 is the government's best weapon
against such "excessive" speculation. The limit-setting power has been criti-
cized as an interference with the hedge facilitating function of speculation on
the theory that large accounts carry the hedging load.105 This contention has,
however, been adequately answered by the discovery that it is the small rather
than the large accounts which generally accommodate hedging. 00
Trading and position limits, now in effect for most of the major commodi-
ties, 0 7 are low enough to preclude major manipulative efforts such as were
possible in the past. 08 In the case of rye and cotton, experience showed
that the original levels were too high to accomplish their purpose. 00  They
were consequently reduced in 1945 and 1946, respectively."10 And the Com-
mission is presently preparing limits for two additional commodities, soybeans
and eggs, in which extensive speculation is now conducted."' These restric-
tions will undoubtedly reduce in the future the disturbing effects of large
speculative operations.
In view of the vital part trading limits play in futures regulation, it is im-
portant that the mechanics for establishing and altering these limits be as
efficient as possible-a goal not achieved under the present scheme. Acting
on the assumption that three departmental heads were better than one, Con-
gress vested control over trading limits in the Commodity Exchange Com-
103. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(a) (6), 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(a) (6) (1946). Because of conditions peculiar to the business of raising capital,
the SEC does permit price stabilization of new issues. For SEC regulations to this
effect, see 97 U. or PA.. L. REv. 572, 573 n.9 (1949). See also Comments, Regulation
of Stock Market Manipulation, 56 YAL.E L.J. 509 (1947); Market Manipulation and
the Securities Exchange Act, 46 YAx L.J. 624 (1937).
104. See notes 69 and 87 supra.
105. SHEPHERD, MARKMNG FAm PRODUCTS 130 (1946).
106. Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on H.R. 6772, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 211 (1936); P. Mehl, Trading in Futures and Price Fluctuations, 16
J. FM Ecox. 488 (1934).
107. See note 87 supra.
108. Successful manipulations before the Act involved very large futures holdings.
For example, while Cargill was running its 1937 corn corner, its corn future holdings
never fell below 6,000,000 bushels. HOFFMAN, SuxvEy 69 (1941). Corn position limits
are now set at 2,000,000 bushels. 17 CODE FED. REGS. § 150.1 (1949). See also REP.
CEA 3 (1947).
109. The inadequacy of rye limits was pointed up by the transactions involved in the
General Foods case. See pages 840-41 supra.
110. 17 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 150.2, 150.3 (1949).
111. See note 87 supra.
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mission. This anomalous body has no regular personnel or specific appro-
priation. It depends on the CEA for virtually all of the technical work in-
cident to the setting of trading limits,1 12 to date the Commission's chief ac-
tivity.113 This diffusion of responsibility among three cabinet members ap-
pears unnecessary in view of the fact that they have apparently consistently
followed the recommendations on trading limits made to them by CEA
officials.114 The Commission should be abolished and its responsibilities
shifted to the Secretary of Agriculture, who already administers most of the
provisions of the Act."15
Margin Requirements. While the power to set trading limits permits the
government to curb speculative transactions of large traders, no method is
presently available to federal authorities to reduce price fluctuations brought
about by the forced liquidation of a sizable number of small speculative ac-
counts. 16 Federal officials have long been seeking to remedy this situation
by urging enactment of legislation empowering the Secretary of Agriculture
or the President to set minimum margin requirements for all speculators.,l 7
These regulations would specify minimum percentages of the contract price
which the customer would have to deposit with his broker when originally
entering into a futures transaction.
Beginning in 1933, all of the exchanges have themselves imposed some
mandatory minimum margin requirements upon non-member traders."18
112. SELLFas, op. cft. supra note 100, at 79-80.
113. Besides establishing speculative trading and position limits, the Commodity
Exchange Commission has handled only two matters since enactment of the Commodity
Exchange Act:
(1) A complaint by Cargill, Inc., against the Chicago Board of Trade for alleged
violation of the Commodity Exchange Act, by requiring Cargill to liquidate some of
its large 1936 and 1937 futures holdings and in extending the time for delivery on some
of these futures, was dismissed by the Commission after extensive hearings. Cargill
v. Chicago Board of Trade, CE-A Docket No. 6 (1940).
(2)' In another dispute between Cargill and the Chicago Board of Trade, the Com-
mission ruled on the validity of nine Board rules and regulations imposed on warehouses
in order for their receipts to be acceptable in satisfaction of futures contracts made on
the Board of Trade. In re Application of Cargill, Inc., for a Declaratory Order, Dec.
14, 1950 (mimeographed).
114. Inquiries to the three Departments whose heads constitute the Commission
have not revealed a single instance in which one of these members objected to the recom-
mendations made to the Commission by a presiding officer who conducts hearings for
this purpose. This presiding officer is either the CEA Administrator or a CEA official
appointed by him. 17 CODn FED. REGS. § 0.77(b) (1949). No record of the deliberations
of the Commission appears to be available. For the procedure followed in preparing
trading limits and the practice of the Department of Justice in this respect, see Com-
munication to the YAix LAW JoURNAL from J. Stephen Doyle, Jr., Special Assistant
to the Attorney General, dated April 13, 1951, in Yale Law Library.
115. Srun s, op. cit. supra note 100, at 79-80.
116. RE,. CEA 7 (1950) ; Hearings, supra note 20, at 2-4, 27-8 (1948).
117. See note 1 supra.
118. See hectographed table, MiNImUm INiTIAL MARGINS PR.SacunF By EXCHANGES,
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These margins are set primarily to protect brokers against customers' de-
faults (since brokers are responsible to the exchange for defaults on contracts)
as well as to protect other customers of a broker forced into bankruptcy by
such defaults. 119 Athough the immediate purpose of the change from permis.
sive to mandatory margin requirements by a number of the largest exchanges
in 1933 was to restrict price fluctuations due to dealings of financially irre-
sponsible speculators, 120 margin levels are still set primarily with a view to the
protective function rather than to minimize price fluctuations.'
2
1
The reluctance of exchanges to raise margin requirements has occasionally
been overcome by strong moral suasion by government officials. A very ac-
tive speculative market in wheat futures in March 1947 brought a request
from the CEA that exchanges raise their minimum margins to 25%.122 This
request was complied with, but only temporarily; margin requirements were
again lowered in May. A further request for margin increases to 333o was
made by the Department in September 1947 but it was not until after a Presi-
dential speech the following month 123 that the desired margins were imposed.
During the first month under the 33y3o requirement, the volume of trading
was reduced by 45%.12 The increase in margins failed to prevent a break
in wheat and corn prices in February 1948, in which liquidation of small ac-
counts played a sinificant role. This may, however, be explained at least in
part by the fact that extensive holdings of wheat and corn futures had already
been acquired in October 1947 when the 3337o' margin was established. 125
The close causal relationship between forced liquidations of small, inade-
quately margined speculative holdings and several recent price breaks 120
compels the conclusion that reasonable margin regulation by the Secretary
of Agriculture would help eliminate these sharp and unnecessary fluctuations.
As oF AuGusT 17, 1950 Ox SpECULATI- FTur.uas TRANSACTIONS IN SPEncmI CoM-
MODInIs, prepared by the CEA.
"In general, speculative margins established by the exchanges are applied orgy to
'outside' traders. For example, members of the Chicago Board of Trade who execute
their own transactions on the trading floor are not required by the rules to deposit
speculative margins. Similarly members who clear their own speculative transactions
through the clearing-house of the exchange need deposit only the much lower clearing-
house margin." Report of the CEA Administrator, July 31, 1950, on the effect of com-
modity speculation on prices for the first month of the Korean war, quoted in 96 Cong.
Rec. 11952 (Aug. 3, 1950).
On the historical development of mandatory exchange margin requirements, see
Hearings, supra note 20, at 100.
119. Id. at 104.
120. Id. at 100.
121. Id. at 104.
122. Id. at 102.
123. For a quotation of the relevant portion of President Truman's address of
October 5, 1947, see id. at 103.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Ibid.
126. Id. at 3.
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Reasonableness implies, on the one hand, levels high enough to permit a trader
to survive sharp temporary fluctuations without being subjected to a demand
for increased margins which he may be unable to meet. On the other hand,
levels must not be so high as to hamper market liquidity or interfere with
the important part small speculators play in accommodating hedges and
stabilizing prices. The record of past futures regulation certainly indicates
that the Department of Agriculture, if it had full power over margins, would
not fix them above a reasonable level. However, to facilitate passage of such
a provision by Congress, the Secretary's authority to set minimum margins
should be limited.127 The precise level to which the Secretary might be re-
stricted must necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. But experience under the
33s3% wheat and corn margins in 1947 indicates that such a maximum
might properly be 40% of the futures contract price.
The provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 investing the Federal
Reserve Board with power to set margin requirements for stock transac-
tions 128 serves not only as a precedent for the suggested legislation but em-
phasizes the need for its passage. A substantial increase in stock margin
requirements tends to cause speculators to shift from securities to the com-
modity markets, where low exchange-established margins have permitted
vast expansion of speculative holdings.129 Hence coordinated restriction of
speculation in both fields is highly desirable to carry out the credit control
function of the Securities Exchange Act margin provision.130 The Secretary
of Agriculture is probably in the best position to decide upon speculative fu-
tures margins on the basis of market information provided him by the CEA;
in the execution of this function, however, close cooperation between the
Secretary and the Federal Reserve Board would be important.
The absence of federal margin requirements has to a large extent been
made a scapegoat for food and other commodity price increases. Actually,
127. Opponents of futures margin legislation repeatedly argue that unlimited discre-
tion to set margins up to 100% of the contract price would give federal officers the power
to destroy the exchanges. See, e.g., id. at 33. Since the valid purpose of such legislation
can be accomplished by limiting margins to a far lower percentage than 100%, it is prob-
ably advisable to eliminate this argument by setting a lid on the Secretary's margin-
fixing power.
128. Section 7, 48 STAT. 886 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78g (1946).
Securities margins are closely analogous to margin deposits in futures transactions
since both protect the broker against customer default in case of adverse price change.
A slight difference arises, however, from the fact that futures are simply agreements to
buy or sell in the future, while shares of stock may immediately be used as collateral.
Stock margins thus constitute part payment for a valuable chose in action, while futures
margins are essentially merely a guarantee that the contract obligation will be performed.
See Hearings, supra note 20, at 53-4.
129. Rxs,. CEA 2 (1947); Hearings, supra note 20, at 20.
130. One purpose of § 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to prevent ab-
normal absorption of credit by speculation. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1934); Szx. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). See Legis., Delegation of
Power Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 COL. L. Rtv. 974, 984 (1936).
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these are chiefly the product of inflationary conditions connected with the
present national emergency and crop outlook. 131 Price trends in 1947-1948
under the 33y/ o% margins dearly indicate that increased margin requirements
will not nullify the effects of these fundamental supply and demand factors.
132
Efforts to control prices should therefore be aimed directly at these under-
lying factors, while margin controls should be restricted to their proper func-
tion of reducing price fluctuations which do not reflect basic market condi-
tions.1s*
Summary. The imposition of higher margin requirements, as well as any
further reduction of trading limits, will undoubtedly reduce the volume of ex-
change trading. It thus becomes important to assure that the proper functions
of speculation-hedge facilitation and price stabilization-are left unhampered.
Speculation now constitutes approximately 75% of all futures transactions
in the major commodities.' 34 The Department of Agriculture has maintained
131. 96 Cong. Rec. 11949-50 (Aug. 3, 1950). See notes 1 and 2 supra.
132. Hearings, supra note 20, at 105.
133. Speaking at Michigan State College on August 22, 1950, Secretary of Agriculture
Brannan conceded that federal regulation of margins would not block commodity price
inflation by itself. N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1950, p. 43, col. 7. And Rep. Cooley, in the
congressional debate on the Defense Production Act of 1950, asserted categorically that
"the price fluctuations which have taken place have occurred not as a result of this
emergency situation or of speculation, but as the result of the natural play of the laws of
supply and demand, as indicated by the Department of Agriculture Crop Reports." 96
Cong. Rec. 11950 (Aug. 3, 1950). For a table prepared by the CEA showing that the
increase in trading in various commodity futures after the outbreak of the Korean fighting
does not correspond directly to the increase in the price of these commodities, see 96
Cong. Rec. 11950 (Aug. 3, 1950). But cf. the view expressed by Rep. Buchanan that
margin controls should be imposed so as to preclude the necessity for establishing com-
modity price ceilings. 96 Cong. Rec. 12405-6 (Aug. 10, 1950). See also note 2 supra.
134. The following table shows the open commitments of reporting and non-reporting
traders (see note 82 supra) on all contract markets, averaging semi-monthly figures, for
the fiscal year 1950. Separation of trades into hedging and speculative transactions is
available only for reporting traders, but these traders generally account for virtually all
hedges. REP. CEA 25 (1950). The proportion of speculative to hedging commitments
shown below is somewhat lower than would be revealed by analysis of trading volhme,
since the open commitment figures do not indicate the speculative transactions of in-and-out
traders and scalpers. Id. at 24.
1 Wheat [ Corn I Soybeans I Cotton
Class ] Long [ Short I Long I Short Long I Short I Long Short
_ Percentage of total open commitments
Reporting traders:
Speculative ..... 32.4 19.0 31.9 22.9 30.4 21.2 20.8 16.8
Hedging ............ 20.8 39.9 9.6 39.1 11.6 32.1 23.8 26.1
Total large traders . ... 1 53.2 I58.9 1 41.5 1 62.0 I42.0 I53.3 1 44.6 42.9
Non-reporting traders .... 46.8 41.1 1 58.5 1 38.0 58.0 46.7 1 55.4 57.1
Total open contracts... 100.0 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 1 100.0 I 100.0
Id. at 26-7.
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that this preponderance of speculative over hedging transaction is unnecessary
to provide sufficient liquidity for successful hedging.135 Available statistics
appear to support this contention. In two successive years of wheat trading
on the Chicago Board of Trade, the daily average number of reported open
hedging contracts remained virtually identical while the total volume of trading,
including speculation, declined by almost 50%.13 6 This indicates that market
liquidity can be sharply curtailed without apparent interference with hedging
operations. Moreover, the Department of Agriculture has received no indica-
tion that a reduction of trading by approximately 457o, resulting from a sharp
increase in margin requirements in the fall of 1947, hampered hedging opera-
tions.137 In the absence of further information as to hedging needs and prac-
tices it is impossible to determine conclusively the volume of speculation
necessary to support hedging. But the present speculation-hedging ratio,
upwards of 8:2, is certainly greater than necessary to meet hedging require-
ments.
Nor is it likely that the price stabilization function of speculation would be
hindered by a limited reduction in trading volume. As in the case of hedge-
facilitation, the exact relationship between the volume of speculation and its
effective stabilizing influence cannot be readily ascertained. However, statistics
indicate that years of high trading volume have occasiqnally been characterized
by greater price fluctuations than some leaner years.138 And reduction of the
volume and magnitude of very large traders' activities actually promotes price
stability. Moreover, the restriction of trading volume which the imposition of
higher margins would entail is aimed directly at reducing unnecessary price
135. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1947, p. 43, col. 5.
136. The relevant volume and open contract figures for these years, fiscal 1938 and
1939, are as follows:
WHEAT FUTURES ON THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE
Total Annual Average Daily Average Daily Open
Volume Open Contracts Hedging Contracts*
1,000 bushels 1,000 bushels 1,000 bushels
1937-38 8,300,837 97,975 59,452
1938-39 4,372,121 93,100 59,700
Compiled from REP. CE ADmiN. 4, 5, 8 (1938) ; REP. CE ADmiN. 3, 6 (1939).
*Hedging figures are available only for reporting traders, i.e., those whose daily
trades or net positions amount to 200,000 bushels or more. See note 82 supra. However,
most hedgers fall into this category since the average hedge position far exceeds the
200,000 figure. See note 32 supra.
137. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from J.M. Mehl, CEA Adminis-
trator, dated March 13, 1951, in Yale Law Library.
138. P. MEHL, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DAILY PUcE CHANGE, OPENING TO
CLOSE, OF THE DOMINANT CORN FUTURE AND THE DAILY VOLUME OF TRADING IN CORN
FUTURES ON THE CHICAGO BAORD OF TRADE (1935), and a similar study made for wheat
futures.
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fluctuations by eliminating inadequately financed accounts. Too large a de-
crease in the volume of trading of small speculators might impede the stabiliz-
ing influence characteristic of small traders, as well as their important part in
providing the market liquidity necessary for hedging on the exchanges. The
Department of Agriculture can, however, be expected to consider these factors
and apply trading restrictions with discretion and restraint.
CONCLUSION
Risks of price fluctuations inherent in the present commodity marketing
system have given rise to the mechanism of futures trading as a means of
shifting these risks to speculators. Farm legislation which has in effect set
floors under the prices of many agricultural commodities,8 9 and recent price
ceilings,' 40 have narrowed the range of such fluctuations. Although this can
be expected to reduce the volume of futures trading, as was the case under
price controls during World War II,141 exchange operations will continue to
serve their functions within the new price limits.
139. See generally, SHnnan, AGRICULTURAL PRICE CONTROL (1945) passim. See
also MEuL, THE FUTURE OF THE FUTURES MARKE:s 7, 12 (1941).
Minimum farm prices are now maintained through the Government's authority to
grant loans to farmers at 90% of the "parity" value of most commodities. 63 STAT. 1051
(1949), 7 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 1950). For a detailed explanation and appraisal of
"parity," see SHEPHERD, AGRICULTURAL PRICE ANALYSIS 191-220 (1947).
140. On Jan. 26, 1951, the Office of Price Stabilization established price ceilings for all
commodities except (1) raw agricultural commodities (at all levels of trade) selling
below parity, see note 139 supra, or (2) processed agricultural commodities at the farm
level when sold below parity there. Processors and distributors of such processed com-
modities were, however, permitted to pass on the exact amount of any increase in their
raw material costs. The order set maximum prices for all other commodities at the
highest level at which each individual dealer and processor made sales during the period
from Dec. 19, 1950, to Jan. 25, 1951. P-H REP. ON BusINEss 12,000 (1951).
The chaotic price pattern which resulted from these individualized ceilings severely
hampered futures trading; the cotton exchanges suspended operations completely and
wheat hedging became impossible. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1951, § 3, p. 1, col. 8; id., Feb. 13,
1951, p. 1, col. 2. This situation was relieved considerably on Feb. 12, when the OPS re-
moved ceilings on wheat, corn, oats, and a number of other commodities selling below
parity levels, as well as on sugar. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, p. 1, col. 2. At the same time the
OPS expedited trading in soybeans, soybean meal, coffee and cocoa by replacing the
general price freeze on these commodities with specific dollars-and-cents ceilings. P-H
REP. ON BUSINESS 2003 (1951). An order of March 3 established a single ceiling
price for each grade and staple of cotton, thus permitting reopening of the cotton
exchanges. Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1951, p. 3, col. 1. And trading in wool and
wool top futures was resumed on April 9 after similar ceilings were fixed for futures in
these commodities. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1951, p. 42, col. 3.
141. Virtually all the major commodities in which futures trading is conducted were
subject to OPA price ceilings during World War II. Exchange operations continued sub-
stantially as usual in a number of commodities whose prices remained below ceiling levels.
But where prices reached these limits, trading declined sharply since hedging became
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Effective operation of the exchange mechanism has been greatly enhanced by
the development of federal regulation and supervision. This control has re-
duced price-distorting influences, and has largely eliminated the sharp practices
which once accompanied speculation. Some improvement in the regulatory
machinery is still needed, however, to obtain full advantage of freely competi-
tive exchange trading. Expansion of the concept of manipulation as used in
the Commodity Exchange Act and authorization of a limited federal margin-
setting power are the most significant of these recommended changes. In
addition, control over trading and position limits should be shifted to the
Secretary of Agriculture. With the adoption of these improvements, futures
trading will be better able to serve its proper functions, while still further
pruned of its disruptive effect on the nation's economy.
unnecessary and speculation unprofitable in the absence of price changes. Scarcity of
deliverable supplies and Government restrictions on deliveries of some commodities con-
stituted further impediments to futures trading and resulted in suspension of trading in
corn, butter, and several other commodities. REP. FoOD DIsTRIBuTION ADmIisTRATioN
107-108 (1943). Futures transactions in most other commodities, however, continued
throughout the war. While the volume of trading on the whole was below pre-war levels,
activity in rye and barley actually increased considerably during the war. See CEA,
COmMODITY FUTURES STATISTICS 7-9 (1947).
[Vol. 60: 822
